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PROSECUTION APPEALS IN WEST VIRGINIA
FRANx E. HORACK JR.Y
Professional interest in criminal law and procedure has not
lagged in West Virginia. The state bar association committee on
criminal law has frequently called attention to the inadequacy of
much of our present court procedure. The committee has sug-
gested the elimination of technical appeals, an improved bail sys-
tem, the short form of indictment, greater freedom in the amend-
ment of pleadings, comment on the defendant's failure to testify,
and many kindred subjects.' Likewise, the prosecuting attorneys
of the state have been active in improving criminal law and pro-
cedure in its practical administration in the courts.2 The bench
also has lent a sympathetic ear to the demands of simplicity and
efficiency where they do not interfere with the valued protection of
individual security. Nor is this interest a local one. First on the
program of the American Bar Association is the improvement of
the administration of justice.3 The United States Department of
Justice also had assumed an active interest in and responsibility
for the constructive adaptation of common law criminal procedure
to the needs of a new and changed social order.4 Indeed, it ap-
pears that those professionally interested in the criminal law
realize that the public is aware that "the administration of crim-
inal law is a disgrace to our civilization" and that they will cor-
rect this administration if the bar does not.
In West Virginia, however, there has been little popular de-
mand for a change in criminal law and administration. This is
not surprising in the light of the state's strong common law tradi-
tions. This common law, at least as the lawyers have seen it, -
through the eyes of Blackstone, Mlinor, and St. George Tucker, -
afforded extensive protections to persons accused of crime.2 In-
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 See 43 W. VA. BAR Asso. REP. 123 (1927); 44 Id. 231 (1928); 47 Id. 88
(1931); 49 Id. 189 (1933).
2 Correspondence with a majority of the prosecuting attorneys of the state
indicates an interest and a desire to simplify and clarify criminal procedure,
to the end that the unfairness of present practices to both defendants and the
state will be eliminated. With the creation of a judicial council (W. Ya.
Acts, 2d Extra. Sess. 1934, c. 71) the interest of this group will be given a
more effective mode of expression.3 Shafroth, The National Bar Program, 19 A. B. A. J. 562 (1933); 20 A.
B. A. T. 37 (1934).
4 The Attorney General's Conference on Crime, Washington, Dec. 10-13,
1934.
r 4 BL. COMM. 361; 3 BL. COM. 379; 1 Tuomp CotMf. 35 et seq. See
also 5 Coke 61: "It is a rule of the common law that no one shall be brought
twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it not for this
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deed, nearly every procedural adjustment seeking to bring the
administration of justice into practical conformity with the ex-
igencies of present day conditions has been considered with reluct-
ance and suspicion if it has necessitated a change from the tradi-
tional common law. And this is so, because individual security
from unjustified governmental prosecution has been highly valued
in West Virginia. Obviously, there should be no thought of re-
linquishing this protection; but newer devices may give greater
effect to the ideal of the common law. Thus, the question in West
Virginia is not whether the common law protections should be
abandoned but rather how may they be most nearly realized.
We are all too familiar with the dependence upon constitu-
tional rules and statutory regulations of the last century. The
most casual reading of the criminal surveys give ample evidence
of their ineffectiveness. 6 The change from one rule to another will
seldom improve administration; at most it can only afford a greater
opportunity for an improved administration. Government, today,
must be a government of laws and a government of men - for it
is man through his creature, law, who determines the character of
the social order. Consequently, changing rules, and procedures
alone will be unimportant; the need for change usually does not
arise from any "inherent" unfaifness in the rule but rather from
an inability adequately to administer criminal justice under its
precepts. Thus when the pace of the social order moves swiftly
beyond the concepts of the past, an urgent demand, first felt in
public and criminal law, arises. It is then that caution must be
exercised for fear that safe-guards proven by centuries of use may
not be swept away too quickly and with too little consideration.
Conversely, however, with a society unknown to Stephens and Hale,
dogmatic retention of useless procedures may injure rather than
advance the cause of individual safety. One of the most contro-
versial rules, the rule against second jeopardy, is of this character.
It exists today not only without fulfilling its historical purpose
but also without serving a modern function. That the rule has
frequently been a protection to innocent persons is not a sufficient
salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run
down by repeated attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because
of this rule it is that a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where
the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant but
not against him. This is a rule of such vital importance to the security of
the citizen that it cannot be impaired but by express words."8 R EPORT Op NATIOxAL CommISSIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EqoRcE-
MENT (1931); CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (1922); MissouRi CRIME
SURVEY (1926).
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reason for its retention, for innocent men will find other and more
useful safeguards; that it frequently protects guilty men is hardly
a sufficient condemnation, for guilty men will nearly always find
unmerited refuge in quite indispensible procedural rules. It is
a sufficient objection, however, that the existence of the double
jeopardy rule encumbers trial procedure and permits every crim-
inal trial to be artificially colored to the prejudice of the State ir-
respective of the merits of the case.
I
Originally second jeopardy meant the second trial of a defend-
ant after one complete trial and verdict according to the then
existing procedure of the common law. The common law rule,
when transplanted into Anglo-American jurisprudence was em-
planted in our constitutional herbarium safe from the reformer's
trowel. It was not, however, safe from judicial horticulture. In
its new environment the common law rule grew into a rule forbid-
ding further prosecution in the same cause once a jury had been
empanelled and a decision on the merits returned. Thus, whatever
the common law may have been, the judicial common law in the
American states came to forbid the state to appeal an adverse de-
cision in a criminal case.7 In West Virginia, as in the majority of
states, this rule has been strictly followed, and this is so although
the constitution confers general appellate jurisdiction upon the
Supreme Court of Appeals in all cases "wherein there has been a
conviction for felony or misdemeanor in a circuit court",'
The right of the state to appeal is specifically reserved by the
7 See Ez parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S. E. 529 (1915). See also W.
VA. CONST., art. IM, § 5. "No person shall .... be twice put in jeopardy
of life or liberty for the same offense." W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 61,
art. 11, § 13: "A person acquitted by the jury upon the facts and merits on
a former trial may plead such acquittal in bar of a second prosecution for
the same offense, notwithstanding any defect in the form or substance of the
indictment or accusation on which he was acquitted." Cf. W. VA. REv. CODE
(1931) c. 61, art. 11, § 13: "A person acquited of an offense, on the ground
of a variance between the allegations and the proof of the indictment or
other accusation, or upon an exception to the form or substance thereof, may
be arraigned again upon a new indictment or other proper accusation, and
tried and convicted for the same offense, notwithstanding such former ac-
quittal." W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 51, art. 1, § 3; c. 58, art. 1, § 1 (j).
Compare State v. Allen, infra. n. 8.
s It was expressly decided in State v. Allen, 8 W. Va. 680, 683 (1875),
that the use of the word "conviction" was not intended to limit appellatejurisdiction to appeals by defendants but was used only for the purpose of
inhibiting the legislature "from legislating away that great right .... of
appeal after conviction in criminal cases, than which no more sacred right
could be guaranteed by the constitution."
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constitution "in all cases relating to the public revenue"," and
general authority to extend additional appellate jurisdiction is
also provided.10 Thus far, however, the legislature has only author-
ized appeals from a judgment or order sustaining the invalidity or
insufficiency of an indictment." *With the general appellate power
limited to revenue cases,1 2 and with only narrow supervisory powers
over other criminal cases, appellate review in West Virginia af-
fords little or no protection to the interests of the state in the prose-
cution and enforcement of criminal justice.
This limitation of review upon behalf of the state is predicated
upon the assumption that the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy forbids state appeals in criminal cases. If the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is a "funda-
mental right", then, does not the defendant place himself in sec-
ond jeopardy by appealing the decision of the trial court. The ex-
planation that he may "waive" his "rights" is hardly satisfactory.
If the right is "fundamental" then it must exist to protect the
accused even against himself.
The explanation is historical. The doctrine of second jeopardy
arose long prior to appellate review of criminal cases.1 ' The pur-
pose of the doctrine of jeopardy was not to prevent appeals, for
they did not exist, but rather to prevent successive original prose-
cutions and punishments for the same offense. With the granting
of appeals in criminal cases the jeopardy rule was applied erron-
eously to the consideration of the case upon appeal, with the
anomalous result that the defendant did not place himself in sec-
ond jeopardy if he appealed, but that if the state appealed second
jeopardy attached.1 4 Thus, the jeopardy rule as applied to prose-
9 W. VA. CoNsT., art. VIII, § 3.
1o Supra n. 7.
21 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 58, art. 5, § 30.
12 Appeals in revenue cases have all involved the enforcement of the liquor
license statute and have all affirmed the operation of the statute. State v.
Allen, 8 W. Va. 680 (1875); State v. Fitzpatrick, 8 W. Va. 707 (1874);
State v. Kyle, 8 W. Va. 711 (1875); State v. Thompson, 26 W. Va. 148(1885). But the appeal must be from final judgment. State v. Bluefield
Drug Co., 41 W. Va. 638, 24 S. E. 649 (1896); State v. Peyton, 58 W. Va.
380, 52 S. E. 393 (1905).
13 For a most illuminating consideration of this question see, Miler, Ap-
peals by the State in Criminal Cases (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 486, reprinted in
(1928) ORE. L. REv. 87. See also Hicks, Hoot Appeals by the State in Crim-
inal Cases (1928) 7 ORE. L. REV. 218; Cooper, Is the Deciding of Moot Crim-
inal Cases a Judicial Function (1928) 7 ORE. L. REv. 228; Note (1933) 23
J. CRi. L. 1039; Note (1919) 26 YALE L. J. 408; (1922) 32 YALE L. J. 93;
Note (1921) 23 MiOH. L. REv. 584; Note (1919) 4 VA. L. REG. (n. s.) 923,
935; (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 340; Note (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. B. 373.
14 See Miller, op. cit. supra n. 13.
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cution appeals became inconsistent and barbarous. But it is one
thing to condemn the rule and quite another thing to correct it.
Courts have not uniformly interpreted the jeopardy rule. In
most jurisdictions it has been treated as a bar to prosecution ap-
peal.' 5 But some courts have said that the rule does not prevent
appeals by the state.'" Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in
Kepner v. United States,17 observed:
"Logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be more
than once in jeopardy in the same cause, liowever often he
may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from
its beginning to the end of the cause. Everybody agrees that
the principle in its origin was a rule forbidding trial in a new
and independent case where a man already had been tried
once. But there is no rule that a man may not be tried twice
in the same case ..... If a statute should give the right to
take exceptions to the Government, I believe it would be im
possible to maintain that the prisoner would be protected by
the Constitution from being tried again. He no more would
be put in jeopardy a second time when retried because of a
mistake in law in his favor, than he would be when retried for
a mistake that did him harm."
Our court in the case of Ex parte Bornee,18 however, follows
the majority view and specifically rejected Holmes' interpretation
of jeopardy. It insisted that the constitution be interpreted ac-
cording to "what the makers of our constitution meant by the use
of the word 'jeopardy'." The court said that
"The framers of our constitution naturally had in mind
the Virginia law of the subject. But that was not different
from the American understanding that a prisoner was once
15 See Miller, op. act. soupra n. 13, at 487-489.
16 "The criminal law must move forward to meet the -new conditions which
confront organized society if its law-abiding members are to be protected in
their personal and property rights. Whatever the rule may have been in the
past decades, we think now, when there is such wide latitude allowed those
convicted of crime to appeal and have their convictions reviewed, there should
be a liberalizing of the attitude towards the commonwealth, where the de-
fendant has been convicted and the question ruled against the commonwealth,
as here, is purely one of law." Commonwealth v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 165
Atl. 498 (1933).
See also, Commonwealth v. Beiderman, 165 Atl. 765 (Pa. 1933) (plea of
autrefois acquit was unavailing although juror was erroneously withdrawn).
McCreary v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 323, 325 (1857).
Outstanding, of course, has been the attitude expressed in State v. Lee, 65
Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894).
Also see State v. Pelch, 92 Vt. 477, 103 Atl. 24 (1918); In re Dexter, 93
Vt. 304, 107 Atl. 134 (1919) and cases cited.
17195 U. S. 100, 24 S. Ct. 797 (1904).
Is 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S. E. 529 (1915).
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in jeopardy whenever, upon a valid indictment, a jury in a
court of competent jurisdiction was regularly empaneled and
sworn to try the issue of his guilt. While we derived the
principle from the common law of our English ancestors, yet
in American jurisprudence at the time of the adoption of our
constitution there had grown up a universally recognized, dis-
tinctly American doctrine on the subject. The principle had
received sanction as a fundamental one to a degree unknown
in the English law. And so with us it still stands to-day." 0
So narrow a theory of constitutional interpretation foists re-
strictive and outworn procedures upon a changed society. Con-
stitutions are more than the skeletal outline of the political and
economic theories of their drafters; they must live and grow with
the people, with government, and with society.20 A constitution
must provide a system of government and administration which
will protect the dominant demands of society and retain popular
respect and confidence. Contemporary experience suggests that
there is a general lack of respect for and confidence in the admin-
istration of justice in America. And this, at a time when con-
fidence in and dependence upon government, both federal and
state, is at a maximum. This disparity is some indication of the
need for a critical examination of the present conditions in crim-
inal law administration.
In discussing the merits of the jeopardy rule, the guilt or
innocence of a particular defendant cannot be assumed, - the
issue is not the result in a particular case but rather the selection
of a procedure which will insure a trial system fair to both the
prosecution and the defense. To assume that the abolition of the
rule would permit the innocent to be twice tried, assumes first the
innocence of the defendant, and secondly, that an appeal is a sec-
ond trial. The real problem is not the mechanistic perfection of
terms but rather the perfection of a procedure which will permit a
fair and an efficient administration of justice. The present system
19 rbid., at 364.
20 "It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a
century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant
to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the
statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it
means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution
must be confirmed to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions
and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement car-
ries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception
that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning: 'WTe must never
forget it is a constitution we are expounding'." Mr. Chief .Tustice Hughes,
speaking for the court in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.
398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 242 (1934).
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has failed to provide a system which fulfills the demands of com-
mon law protections or the standards of efficiency made necessary
by the increased needs for effective criminal law administration.
In practice, today, the defendant in criminal proceedings is
almost without restriction in what he may say or do2' and at the
same time the prosecutor is held to a strict compliance with the
rules of practice and procedure and to constitutional limitations.
This is entirely the result of the one-sided system of appeals which
prevents the state from reviewing the activities of the defense or
the rulings in its favor. Thus, in most states, the orderly admin-
istration of criminal procedure is largely dependent upon the ac-
quiescence of the defense counsel. The prosecuting attorney can
do but little to protect the interests of the state. "He knows that
a record is being made of his words and actions upon which he
may later be taken to task but that he may make no record of the
words or actions of the attorney for the defense which will serve
for any purpose.' '22 Without the protection of appeal the prose-
cutor must be cautious in word and action. Consequently, the
public frequently believes him to be dull; while the defense counsel,
unrestricted in his method of attack, is credited with undeserved
cleverness.
The right of the state to appeal would impose upon the de-
fense counsel the same responsibility for his words and actions as
he demands of the prosecutor. Thus, the equality of position re-
sulting from granting state appeals would do much to improve the
quality of practice before the criminal courts of the state. The
experience in other states tends to indicate an improvement in the
character of counsel and an increase of efficiency in the disposition
of cases. Prosecuting attorneys in West Virginia are almost unan-
imously of the opinion that as a result of the right of the state
to appeal in criminal cases there would be an improvement in the
quality of procedure and practice on the part of the counsel and
the court. 23
21 The defendant is so fully protected that his attorney may conduct him-
self in a manner that places him in contempt of court and yet if the court
errs as a result of such conduct the defendant is permitted to take advantage
of it.
22 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 13, at 509.
23 In response to questions addressed to the several prosecuting attorneys
of the state, the replies to the general question "Do you believe that the
granting of the right of appeal to the state in criminal cases would improve
the quality of criminal procedure and practice in this statel '" were overwhelm-
ingly favorable. Asked whether the state appeal wotld "restrain unfair tac-
tics of defense counsil" all but one prosecutor replied affirmatively. Three
thought the state appeal would have no effect.
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It is frequently objected, however, that prosecuting attorneys
engage as frequently in unfair speech and conduct as do defense
counsel,24 and that the grant of the prosecution appeal would in-
crease these practices. Such statements are largely argumentive,
for the relative amount of misconduct between defense and prose-
cution counsel is, of course, unknown and probably undiscoverable.
The errors of the prosecuting attorney are only more evident for
his record is always subject to appellate review. The transgTes-
sions of the defense counsel appear only interstitially.25 Indeed
the error for which the prosecuting attorney is reprimanded may
have resulted from the deliberate and intentional activity of the
defense counsel. Likewise, the state is helpless if the prosecuting
attorney intentionally commits error in order to insure the ac-
cused an acquittal or a reversal upon appeal.
If the error that leads to an acquittal is made by the judge the
prosecuting attorney is powerless to protect the interests of the
state. If the judge indulges in prejudicial comment or grants an
erroneous instruction the accused will usually be granted a new
trial by the appellate court; but if the judge's error favors the
accused the prosecuting attorney can make no record that will
avail him for he cannot appeal.26 Indeed, prosecuting attorneys
24As to the activities of the prosecutor see State v. Hayes, 109 W. Va.
296, syl. 2, 153 S. E. 496 (1930). "Where remarks of counsel have been
excepted to, and the court has thereupon told the jury not to consider opinions
of counsel, but pass on the case upon the evidence, the appellate court will
not reverse, unless it clearly appears that the accused was prejudiced by the
remarks." I
But see State v. Morris, 96 W. Va. 291, syl. 3, 122 S. E. 914 (1924).
"The persistent effort to introduce improper and prejudicial evidence, in
spite of the rulings by the court of its illegality, can only be for the pur-
pose of prejudicing the jury, and is not wholly cured by instructions to dis-
regard it."
Apparently if counsel desists and the defendant does not object there is no
error. State v. Alie, 82 W. Va. 601, 96 S. E. 1011 (1918).
But, some latitude must be allowed counsel in discussing the case; the
defendant must promptly object and the jury must be instructed to disre-
gard, but there should be no reversal unless the words reasonably appear
prejudicial. State v. Cooper, 74 W. Va. 472, 82 S. E. 358 (1914), citing
earlier West Virginia cases; State v. Scurlock, 99 W. Va. 629, 130 S. E. 263
(1925); State v. Wolfe, 99 W. Va. 694, 129 S. B. 748 (1925).
21 "The statement of the prosecuting attorney was provoked by that of the
attorney for the prisoner, and a reply to it." State v. Allen, 45 W. Va. 65,
73-74, 30 S. B. 209 (1898).
2" "The law announced by the trial court, however erroneous and out-
rageous .... constituted the law of the case, for it was the last word of the
last court under such circumstances . . . . Regardless of the bitterness of the
dose, the State had to take it.)" State v. Whitmore, 185 N. E. 547, 549 (Ohio
St. 1933).
"During the admission of testimony, the court made ironical comments
thereon, unfavorable to the accused, in the presence of the jury ..... This
was error." State v. Hively, 103 W. Va. 237, 239, 136 S. E. 862 (1927).
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seldom make objections to rulings on evidence or instructions for
they find there is little value in making them, except perhaps as it
will help them before the jury - and all too frequently juries
misunderstand this activity.
Criminal procedure under the present system had developed
from the viewpoint of the defendant. In fact, even the substantive
law of crime has felt the effect of the one-sided appellate system.
The inability of the state to appeal from erroneous instructions,
from adverse rulings or to correct unethical practices of defense
counsel has hindered improvement in the administration of jus-
tice. Thus, in many states one rule of law is applied in one court
and a different practice develops in another. In fact at times laws
are at once, constitutional and unconstitutional within the same
state.
The consideration of the problem of appeal cannot be com-
pleted without a consideration of the cost of criminal law admin-
istration. Economy in government lends weight to the value of
the state appeal. In the administration of the criminal law many
criminals are never apprehended. Of those, arrested only a small
per cent are actually brought to trial. For example, in repre-
sentative "West Virginia counties over seventy-five per cent of the
criminal cases are disposed of without a jury, - the prosecuting
attorneys obtaining a plea of guilty in about half the cases and
entering a nolle prosequi in the remainder." In other words,
justice in West Virginia, as elsewhere,2 8 is in fact administered by
the prosecuting 'attorney; he either secures a plea of guilt or dis-
misses the case. The relatively small percentage of cases that
actually go to the jury go there because the prosecuting attorney
thinks that he can procure a conviction. Thus, "the farther the
proceeding goes in each particular case, the greater the probability
of guilt and the greater the capital outlay of investment which the
state puts into making the prosecution effective. -"21  It is only
reasonable then that the state should be permitted to safeguard its
investment and protect the administration of justice from irreg-
27These figures are taken from the author's unpublished survey of crim-
inal justice in West Virginia (1932) in cooperation with The Johns Hopkins
Institute of Law, Johns Hopkins University.
28 Eighty-seven per cent of the cases terminated in federal district courts
during the past 20 years have been disposed of prior to trial. In 1933 non-jury terminations constituted ninety-two. per cent of all dispositions. See also
the special reports of The Johns Hopkins Institute of Law, Johns Hopkins
University.
29 See Miller, op. cit. supra n. 13, at 503.
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ularities which make long and expensive trials valueless. The
state appeal would in large part afford this protection.
Numerous objections have been urged against these consider-
ations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice.
Defense counsel argue that every man is entitled to the judgment
of his peers and that appellate review by the state would deprive
the accused of this "right"23 It also has been said that juries
exercise extra-legal control over the enforcement of unwise or un-
popular laws and that their acquittals are but the expression of
community opinion. There is merit in this form of local option if
it is admitted that the law should not apply where the people do
not wish it to apply and that the jury is the proper forum for its
expression. But, if the common law is our guide its purpose and
origin argue against this very result. The chief argument center-
ing around the verdict of the, jury is that appellate courts might
reverse verdicts of acquittal because a verdict was contrary to the
evidence. So long as the state, to secure a conviction, must prove
guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" this objection is largely argu-
mentative. Reversals by appellate courts on the ground that the
jury's verdict was contrary to the evidence, would be difficult,
inasmuch as the state would still be required to establish its case
as required by the common law.
The hardship and the expense of trial, and more particularly
of appellate review, have frequently been made the bases of attack
upon the right of the state to appeal. The validity of this objec-
tion, however, is predicated upon the assumption that the defend-
ant is innocent. It is submitted that that is the question in issue.
If the accused is proven guilty then he should not be heard to com-
plain, for whatever loss he has suffered must either be figured as
a part of the penalty imposed for the commission of the crime or
else it is an expense or hardship which he voluntarily assumed by
not entering a plea of guilty. If he is innocent then he may in-
deed have cause to complain. But this is also true under our pres-
ent system. The increased burden of appeal may be obviated in
part by granting preferred position on the calendar to criminal
appeals. The unfairness of expense is not alone the ill of prose-
cution appeal, it exists as an inherent burden of all legal activity.
In civil actions many individuals are subjected to long and expen-
sive trials at the demand of private persons, and the law gives only
partial relief. Certainly where the state is the interested party
3OKepner v, United States, supra n, 17.
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the defendant should have no greater rights than when a private
person commences the action. If the objection is serious, no legal
objection stands in the way of permitting the state to assume the
cost of the appeal. For the most part objections of this character
are not too seriously advanced. It is as one prosecuting attorney
in this state has said, "Mlost defendants feel that you are imposing
upon them to bring them to trial at all."
Likewise, the suggestion that the reputation of the defendant
will suffere, is without merit, for if the defendant is in fact guilty,
the loss of reputation must certainly be accepted as one of the
costs of the crime; while if he is innocent, no more satisfactory
exposition of it can be obtained than from the opinion of the court
of highest appeal.
A few prosecuting attorneys have suggested in their memor-
anda on this question that the additional burden on an already
over-worked court would be undesirable. This is perhaps a valid
argument for the limitation of all appeals but hardly a valid justi-
fication of limitation of appeal to one group of litigants. Should
all civil appeals be limited to defendants? Unquestionably it
would reduce the number of appeals; but it hardly seems that the
policy by which the result would be accomplished would be partic-
ularly desirable. And at all events the threat of an increased bur-
den on appellate courts is probably greater than the actual bur-
den would be. The experience of other states indicates that the
number of state appeals is not large.3 ' The effectiveness of the
state appeal lies not in the fact that the state may or will take a
large number of appeals but rather in the restraint that it will
impose upon the trial of the case. The essential usefulness of the
state appeal is to insure orderly trial procedure. Its real value
lies in its preventative character - if it is successful in this, it
seldom will be necessary to exercise its curative function.
II
There are four ways in which West Virginia can free itself of
the barbarities of the jeopardy rule: (1) the decision in Ex parte
Bornee can be reversed, (2) legislation adapting Holmes' sugges-
tion in the Kemper case can prepare the way for a new judicial
interpretation of the constitutional provision, (3) a legislative sys-
tem of "moot appeals" can be established, or (4) a constitutional
amendment redefining jeopardy can be adopted.
31 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 13.
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The reversal of the decision in the Bornee case, of course,
would be the simplest method of providing adequate procedure for
criminal prosecutions; but in light of the court's decision in the
original case, this method of alteration probably would be the most
difficult. And yet, it seems difficult to assume that American juris-
prudence could have changed the original English procedure, but,
when a new social order demanded, was powerless to inaugurate a
procedure to provide a newer and greater freedom. Constitutions
exist to insure results more than to detail minute procedures. A
larger view of the jeopardy rule would give a better protection to
individual security and would free criminal procedure from the
shackles of an outworn system. However, in the light of settled
constitutional experience in West Virginia, it is doubtful that any
relief can be expected without a more ritualistic change2.-
If any change can be effected through judicial agencies, every
legislative assistance should be offered. Holmes has suggested that
if a statute specifically gave the government the right to false ex-
ceptions3 and, it might be added, specifically defined jeopardy to
include appellate procedure, there would be no constitutional basis
on which to object. Opinion was equally divided among the prose-
cuting attorneys who answered the author's inquiry concerning
the desirability of this method for changing the jeopardy rule.34
Statutory changes seem far more possible than the more certain,
but more difficult method of constitutional amendment. After
the Bornee case, the perils of unfavorable judicial decision, of
course, are great; but it must be remembered that the Bornee de-
cision involved a liquor violation and concerned the interpretation
of a statute which did not have as its primary motive the improve-
ment of the judicial process. If general legislation was enacted
which would insure adequate safeguards for individual security
and at the same time provide a fair and more effcctive trial pro-
32 See n. 19, supra. But note that the Vermont Supreme Court in State v.
Felch, . upra n. 16, said, "We now hold that relief from the vexation of a
second trial is not one (a right guaranteed by due process) and that the con-
stitutional provisions under discussion are not infringed by the statute in
question. The view is indirectly approved in Ex parte Bornee, supra, wherein
attention is called to the fact that the Constitution of Virginia (which in this
respect is like our own) does not prevent the passage of an act granting the
state the right of appeal in criminal cases." (Italics ours).
33 See n. 17, supra.
34 Although the opinion on the validity of a legislative "re-definition" ofjeopardy was quite equally divided, definite opinion was expressed by some
prosecutors concerning such an attempt. For example, one said, "I think
that any attempt on the part of the Legislature to define 'jeopardy' would
be unconstitutional since the word 'jeopardy' had a well-defined judicial
meaning at the time the constitutional provision was adopted .... "
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cedure, the Borneo decision might be limited to the particular
class of offenders, because compared with other offenders it raised
an unusual presumption against them, and yet might be, as clearly,
valid when established as a rule of general procedure.
A third method, the "moot appeal", was almost unanimously
rejected by the prosecuting attorneys as an undesirable compromise
between the present rule and an improved system of criminal pro-
cedure." The moot appeal merely gives to the state the right of
appealing any nisi prius decision for the purpose of establishing
a decision for future precedent, the decision on appeal not affect-
ing the case appealed or the security of the defendant in the case.
Thus, the incentive to the defense to take unfair advantages and
indulge in unfair tactics would not be weakened. It is an empty
victory if the state gains a reversal of an instruction after an ap-
peal to the court of last resort; it is a victory which does not in-
sure protection from the same practice in future trials. There is
little reason for the prosecutor to appeal under such circumstances,
and less reason for the defense to defend. Thus, the criticism that
has been directed against the advisory opinion and other forms of
non-controversial and ex parte settlements applies with equal
strength to the moot appeal.
In spite of these objections several states have adopted moot
appeals statutes and find them useful in their criminal procedure.
The Iowa statute is typical of the least desirable form. 0 No pro-
vision is made for defense representation and consequently it is
infrequent that a full consideration of the problem is provided the
appellate court. A criminal procedure that is hampered by a
defense-dominated trial cannot be remedied by a prosecution-con-
trolled appeal.
Ohio, to avoid this difficulty, provided at an early date that
when the state appealed a criminal case, a copy of the bill of ex-
ceptions should be served upon the trial court.37  The trial judge
was then authorized to appoint a "competent attorney to argue
35 Ten prosecutors favored a moot appeals plan, but suggested that its
adoption was desirable only in case a real state appeals system was impossible.
so See IoWA CODE (1927) § 14012. "If the state appeals, the supreme
court cannot reverse or modify the judgment so as to increase the punishment,
but may affirm it, and shall point any error in the proceedings or in the
measure of punishment, and its decision shall be obligatory as law." See also
N. D. Cozip. LAWS (1913) § 11021.37 Omo GENERAL CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 13681-13684; NEn. COmP. STAT.(1922) §§ 10192-10194. See State v. DeWolfe, 67 Neb. 321, 93 N. NV. 746(1903) ; State v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 533, 85 Pac. 977 (1906); City of Sheri-
dan v. Caddie, 24 Wyo. 302, 157 Pac. 892 (1916). 19 L. R. A. 342,
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the case against the prosecuting attorney" for a fee not to exceed
one hundred dollars. By this plan, Ohio attempts to hypothecate
the safeguards of litigous reality. The human element predom-
inates in the law; so long as the defendant is secure in the result
of the nisi prius proceedings he will give little aid to the criticism
of those proceedings by appellate courts. Only when the defend-
ant will suffer for misconduct during trial will the temptation
cease. If the goal is an improved trial procedure, rather than
"corrected decisions" in individual cases, then the moot appeal is
unsatisfactory.
Probably, a constitutional amendment would be the most satis-
factory method of changing the jeopardy rule. Certain disadvan-
tages, of course, exist. Solidifying any rule, no matter how sal-
utary, in the relative rigidity of constitutional provision entails
the danger of perpetuating a system ill adapted to a changing
society. Likewise, the use of the amendatory process reduces the
ability to modify the constitution by more flexible means. Locally,
the greatest objection to using the constitutional amendment is the
likelihood that a technical amendment of this character could not
be adopted except in the process of a general constitutional revi-
sion. It would be difficult to arouse sentiment sufficiently to pro-
mote a separate and individual amendment, and a constitutional
revision appears extremely improbable.
Among the prosecuting attorneys, however, there is an almost
universal belief in the desirability of this change.3 s A majority
of the attorneys expressed their opinion that granting the state
the right of appeal in criminal cases would improve the quality of
criminal procedure and strengthen the character of practice in
the courts of criminal jurisdiction in the state. Likewise, they
thought that a more uniform practice in ruling on evidence and
motions, and in instructing juries would be developed. There was
but a single dissenting vote to the proposition that the state's ap-
peal would restrain unfair defense tactics. On the much debated
question of the infringement of the "rights" of the accused there
was also agreement, - only two prosecutors believing that equality
of appeal would be harmful. Indeed, much of the compassion for
38 or example, one prosecutor writes, "I still believe in protecting the
accused as much as possible."2 Another says, "If there is any doubt as to
the correctness of an instruction, that doubt is resolved against the State and
in favor of the accused and I believe this is in accord with the theory of our
law that it is better to occasionally allow a guilty man to escape rather than
tW run an7 risk of unjustly convicting an innocent person."
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accused persons is but the remnant of a now false sympathy oc-
casioned by medieval persecutions of the British Crown.
It may be objected that the prosecuting attorney is a partisan
and thus his conclusions should be discounted. Nothing in the
replies of these men indicated such an attitude; rather, their letters
indicated a full and serious appreciation of their responsibilities
as officers of the court in the administration of criminal justice.
Nor to them is the state's appeal an unmixed blessing, for with its
advantages, it also brings the added burdens of an increased ap-
pellate practice. Thus, if reliance can be placed upon the exper-
ience and fairness of these prosecutors, it appears that in addition
to the theoretical benefits that favor the equality of appeal there
are the practical advantages of a more efficient, a fairer, trial,
which would build toward a more adequate and effective law en-
forcement.
Careful organization and thorough understanding is neces-
sary to the improvement of the administration of justice. Coop-
eration on this problem of jeopardy may furnish a beinning for a
complete program for the adoption of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.3 9 The unified action of the Judicial Council, the State Bar
Association, the prosecuting attorneys, and the College of Law
would greatly assist the orderly administration of criminal law
so as to provide real justice in a changing society.40
39 See CoDE Op CRImINAL PRoCEDuRE (Am. Law Inst. 1930).
40 Reflective of the attitude of many, one prosecutor wrote, "I hope the
College of Law will take a lead in these matters so that our State will lead in
the reform of criminal procedure." From the combined interests of these
many groups, perhaps, an Institute of West Virginia Criminal Law and Ad-
ministration can be established. The problems for study are many. From
valuable letters written by prosecuting attorneys, topics for study were sug-
gested, - an inferior criminal court system, comment on defendant's failure
to testify, equality in "striking" the jury, amendment of indictments, the
reasonable doubt rule, the filing of an alibi prior to trial, etc. Within the
confines of the jeopardy rule many problems exist: Should the jeopardy rule
be applied differently in misdemeanor and felony casesl Should state's ap-
peal be limited to "questions of law", the introduction of evidence, ruling
on instructions, etc? Should the state's appeal and the defendant's appeal
be equall If so, to what extent should both be limited? Useful answers to.
these questions can only be built from the practical experience of lawyers andjudges cooperating in the construction of a plan for an orderly administrafion
of justice.
